The Status of the Theoretical Project
Looking at John Hejduk's work, and reading its gloss by Alberto Perez-Gomez, raises questions concerning the place of theory in relation to architectural practice. Is the "theoretical project" a form of authentic architecture? Perez-Gomez argues that phenomenology has proven fallacious the assumption that "theory and practice (mind and body) relate to one another as in a mechanistic diagram." (1) Theory is an activity of consciousness, and consciousness is always embodied consciousness. Their intrinsic interrelation means that thinking cannot occur except through the content which it intends. This connection rejects any implications of Cartesian dualism. It is experienced content, whether of thought, dream or sensation, which provides the phenomenal ground of our existence. Perez-Gomez agrees with this, but his own exclusionary polemic does not accept the full implications of the interactive nature of this ground.(2) The concretization of the theoretical (be it Perez-Gomez's or Hejduk's) in the mimetic/metonymic work of Hejduk shows the limitations of their approach to architecture. Architecture as art includes a priori the aspects which Perez-Gomez shunts aside...especially the logos of science.
Architecture is a discipline with a very wide cultural base. It reflects the full complexity and ambiguity of 'knowing' in the profound sense because it combines the dipoles of practical and poetic life. It is not merely that it combines the aesthetic with the structural, the technical, the rational (order and program), the sensual and the intellectual (historical memory, the symbolic, etc.), but that it operates as an 'art' and a 'thinking' of all of those components as well. In philosophical jargon, real architecture is always both itself and meta-architecture . . . it operates as both a specific object and as a set of relationships and qualities which engage across the whole of culture. Perez-Gomez claims that theory is always embodied theory (embodied within practice). It is difficult to assess the truth of this claim, especially in its hard form that theory is intrinsic with the full nature of the practical. Heidegger's understanding of how we dwell amongst things, how we orient and find belonging through our interrelation with things at hand and things made by hand, shows that the opposite is surely true. Practice always involves the theoretical; directly or without intention. However, theory can stand significantly apart, within what we call the ideal; a thin, reduced, and thus abstract connection to reality's infinitude. Its participation in the fullness of culture is governed by a coefficient of unrealizability which arises through its interaction with the real (existing, in part, outside of its control). This supports the argument that theoretical projects are meta-architectural, and however important as disclosing, critical or inventive explorations, they cannot constitute architecture proper.
In Hejduk's work, especially his inclusion of the written word as an architectural device, the question becomes whether the boundaries of architecture are elastic enough to include written language. Heidegger's explication of language as the "house of being" is misapplied by Perez-Gomez in his effort to directly relate it to architecture while negating the peculiar qualities which give architecture its noumetic identity. Language involves a displacement, allowing for indirect reference to the eidetic in experience, but architecture's reference is of a different kind. Architecture does not exist as displaced from fundamental reality, but exists as a part of it . . . it exists within and without of experience. It straddles between the ideal and the real. It relates to life's complex of physical, emotional and intellectual intentions by making 'place' which reflects, suggests, encourages, permits, discourages or excludes them from possibility. Furthermore, architecture's explication of life's richness requires of its occupants a participation of equal attention. Architecture is completed through its occupation.
Hejduk's use of words to search for a figural ground provides a powerful criticism of the generalized loss of poiesis within the mainstream of modern culture, but it ignores the real need for the reintroduction of poetics into the very fabric of architecture; into its own devices and referential systems. Heidegger's notion of 'naming' is epistemologically prior to metynomy, and is not approached through such literal devices. Even complex narrative cannot stand in substitution for the inherent meanings of architectural organization, structural expression, colour, texture, material and form. At the deepest level, it is wrong to claim that the theory which reflects the mind is no longer a logos, but a poiesis. The revelation of Heidegger is that the ultimate ground reveals itself as a point of collapse between these two. Hejduk's work, as concrete poetry, as storia remains as fiction, a luxury which real architecture cannot afford. Real architecture satisfies by maintaining an uneasy equilibrium between logos and poiesis.
Notes -
1. Alberto Perez-Gomez, “John Hejduk and the Cultural Relevance of Theoretical Projects,” in AA Files, no. 13, Autumn 1986: 26.
2. By this I refer to his discourse which pits common sense opposites against each other at the profound level of ontological and metaphysical foundations. For example: poiesis against logos, prose against poetry, the specific and mutable against the ideal and universal, and further; disclosure of meaning against invention, and modern body image against that of the Classical.
Architecture is a discipline with a very wide cultural base. It reflects the full complexity and ambiguity of 'knowing' in the profound sense because it combines the dipoles of practical and poetic life. It is not merely that it combines the aesthetic with the structural, the technical, the rational (order and program), the sensual and the intellectual (historical memory, the symbolic, etc.), but that it operates as an 'art' and a 'thinking' of all of those components as well. In philosophical jargon, real architecture is always both itself and meta-architecture . . . it operates as both a specific object and as a set of relationships and qualities which engage across the whole of culture. Perez-Gomez claims that theory is always embodied theory (embodied within practice). It is difficult to assess the truth of this claim, especially in its hard form that theory is intrinsic with the full nature of the practical. Heidegger's understanding of how we dwell amongst things, how we orient and find belonging through our interrelation with things at hand and things made by hand, shows that the opposite is surely true. Practice always involves the theoretical; directly or without intention. However, theory can stand significantly apart, within what we call the ideal; a thin, reduced, and thus abstract connection to reality's infinitude. Its participation in the fullness of culture is governed by a coefficient of unrealizability which arises through its interaction with the real (existing, in part, outside of its control). This supports the argument that theoretical projects are meta-architectural, and however important as disclosing, critical or inventive explorations, they cannot constitute architecture proper.
In Hejduk's work, especially his inclusion of the written word as an architectural device, the question becomes whether the boundaries of architecture are elastic enough to include written language. Heidegger's explication of language as the "house of being" is misapplied by Perez-Gomez in his effort to directly relate it to architecture while negating the peculiar qualities which give architecture its noumetic identity. Language involves a displacement, allowing for indirect reference to the eidetic in experience, but architecture's reference is of a different kind. Architecture does not exist as displaced from fundamental reality, but exists as a part of it . . . it exists within and without of experience. It straddles between the ideal and the real. It relates to life's complex of physical, emotional and intellectual intentions by making 'place' which reflects, suggests, encourages, permits, discourages or excludes them from possibility. Furthermore, architecture's explication of life's richness requires of its occupants a participation of equal attention. Architecture is completed through its occupation.
Hejduk's use of words to search for a figural ground provides a powerful criticism of the generalized loss of poiesis within the mainstream of modern culture, but it ignores the real need for the reintroduction of poetics into the very fabric of architecture; into its own devices and referential systems. Heidegger's notion of 'naming' is epistemologically prior to metynomy, and is not approached through such literal devices. Even complex narrative cannot stand in substitution for the inherent meanings of architectural organization, structural expression, colour, texture, material and form. At the deepest level, it is wrong to claim that the theory which reflects the mind is no longer a logos, but a poiesis. The revelation of Heidegger is that the ultimate ground reveals itself as a point of collapse between these two. Hejduk's work, as concrete poetry, as storia remains as fiction, a luxury which real architecture cannot afford. Real architecture satisfies by maintaining an uneasy equilibrium between logos and poiesis.
Notes -
1. Alberto Perez-Gomez, “John Hejduk and the Cultural Relevance of Theoretical Projects,” in AA Files, no. 13, Autumn 1986: 26.
2. By this I refer to his discourse which pits common sense opposites against each other at the profound level of ontological and metaphysical foundations. For example: poiesis against logos, prose against poetry, the specific and mutable against the ideal and universal, and further; disclosure of meaning against invention, and modern body image against that of the Classical.
posted by haro d' aires at 1:16 p.m.
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